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STATE OF TENNESSEE V. ANTOINE 
PERRIER* 
NICKOLAS BOLDUC & DAKOTA DEXTER 
This opinion arose from a February 2010 shooting that occurred in a 
Memphis, Tennessee convenience store. According to trial testimony, 
convicted felon Antoine Perrier, the defendant, and his female acquaintance 
visited the Miracles Mini Market to purchase alcohol. Inside the store, a 
customer “ogled” the defendant’s acquaintance and later exchanged words 
with the defendant outside the store. While the testimony concerning the 
level of the words’ hostility differed, the witnesses all agreed that the 
defendant drew a pistol from his person and fired towards the store door. 
Several shots passed through one victim’s clothing without causing injury. 
However, a child inside the store was not so lucky. Investigators then 
discovered that the defendant possessed the only weapon at the scene. The 
Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the defendant on one count of attempted 
second-degree murder, one count of employing a firearm during the 
commission of a dangerous felony, and six counts of aggravated assault. 
At trial, the defendant testified that he shot in self-defense due to one 
of the victim’s actions. After the conclusion of evidence, the trial court 
provided the pattern self-defense jury instruction to the jury, but added 
language regarding actions that may constitute unlawful activity as to negate 
the “no duty to retreat” language of the self-defense statute. The trial court 
listed various illegal conduct related to the self-defense statute and instructed 
the jury that it was to determine whether the defendant was “engaged in 
unlawful activity” at the time he fired his pistol when it decided whether the 
defendant could properly claim self-defense without retreat. After 
deliberations, the jury rejected the defendant’s self-defense claim and 
convicted him of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-
included offense of attempted second-degree murder; one count of 
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; five 
counts of aggravated assault; and one count of assault of the store owner as 
a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. During the defendant’s post-
conviction proceedings, the post-conviction court granted the defendant a 
delayed appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee. This decision resulted 
therefrom. 
                                                 
 *  State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 407 (Tenn. 2017). 
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the Tennessee legislature 
intended that the phrase “not engaged in unlawful activity” contained in the 
self-defense statute constituted a condition on an individual’s privilege to not 
retreat prior to exercising self-defense. The court further held that the trial 
court should determine whether a defendant was engaged in unlawful activity 
at the time of the alleged self-defense so as to negate the applicable 
instruction. The Supreme Court of Tennessee also concluded that the trial 
court properly instructed the jury when the trial court did not instruct the jury 
on a lesser-included offense of employing a firearm in the commission of a 
dangerous felony; that the indictment provided sufficient notice of the 
qualifying dangerous felony for purposes of the “employing a firearm” 
charge; that the trial court did not err when it failed to instruct the jury on the 
necessity defense; and that the State introduced sufficient evidence to convict 
the defendant of assault of the store owner. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee first resolved a legal question as to 
whether the statutory language “not engaged in unlawful activity” applies 
only to the statutory privilege to not retreat prior to engaging in self-defense. 
Specifically, a defendant claiming self-defense is entitled to a jury instruction 
on the duty to not retreat from a confrontation “only when the person was not 
engaged in unlawful activity and was in a place the person had a right to be.”1 
Here, this holding sealed the defendant’s fate. In practical terms, if one is 
engaged in unlawful activity at the time of the alleged act of self-defense, he 
or she must retreat before threatening or using force or both. The court noted 
that these holdings abrogated Dyson2 and overruled Montgomery.3 
The court also held that the trial court possesses the duty to determine 
whether the defendant met the conditions for the instruction on the privilege 
not to retreat. The court referenced Fuller v. State,4 which had similar 
underlying facts, to decide this issue, reasoning that having the trial court 
decide whether the defendant submitted evidence to justify issuing the 
instruction was compatible with the pattern self-defense instruction. Indeed, 
a Tennessee trial court must provide a self-defense instruction when the proof 
                                                 
 1. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b)(1). 
 2. State v. Dyson, No. W2014-01818-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 9466679 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. Dec. 28, 2015), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 19, 2016). 
 3. State v. Montgomery, No. E2014-01014-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3409485 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. May 28, 2015), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2015). 
 4. Fuller v. State, --- So.3d ---, 2015 WL 9261777 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec. 18, 2015), 
perm. app. denied, (Ala. 2017). The defendant argued that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it instructed the jury that the defendant, a previously-convicted felon, 
had a duty to retreat. The trial court provided this instruction because it found that the 
defendant was “engaged in unlawful activity” by being “in possession of a pistol . . . at the 
time of the shooting.” The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant’s 
argument because the defendant “unlawfully possessed a firearm before he drove by the 
house where [the victim] was located and the altercation occurred.” That court of criminal 
appeals stated that “[w]e certainly do not believe that the Alabama legislature intended to 
avail armed violent felons of its stand-your-ground law.” 
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“fairly rais[es]” the issue.5 Thus, the trial court could simply decide another 
legal issue regarding the jury instruction, and this procedure provides yet 
another duty for the trial court. Moving forward, parties must submit 
evidence to obtain whatever instruction result they desire. The defense must 
put forth evidence to fairly raise the self-defense issue so that the applicable 
instruction will be provided. Likewise, the State must produce clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity so 
that the duty-to-retreat instruction would be inapplicable. 
Due to the applicability of these new holdings, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee then had to decide whether the trial court committed reversible 
error when it instructed the jury. The state supreme court held that the trial 
court erred when it instructed the jury. However, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee then held that the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The state supreme court held the error harmless “because 
no reasonable jury would have accepted the defendant’s self-defense theory. 
The court also left the defendant’s “causal nexus” argument for another day. 
Indeed, the accredited facts demonstrated that, as only mere words were 
exchanged prior to the shooting, the defendant could not have been in 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to warrant self-defense. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee also decided several other issues, 
all against the defendant. First, the court decided that the trial court did not 
plainly err when it failed to instruct the jury on “possession of a firearm” as 
a lesser-included offense of “employment of a firearm during the commission 
of a dangerous felony.” The defendant argued that the court should adopt the 
Henderson rule.6 However, comparing the facts to another decision, the court 
did not address the defendant’s argument regarding Henderson because it 
determined that the evidence clearly showed that the defendant did not 
merely possess the firearm. Indeed, the defendant fired the pistol during the 
store altercation, and thus he actually employed the firearm. Accordingly, the 
court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by not instructing the 
jury on “possession of a firearm.” 
Additionally, the court decided that the indictment provided 
adequate notice of the underlying felony to the defendant for purposes of the 
“employing a firearm” charge. Pursuant to both the state and federal 
constitutions, a defendant must be properly noticed to a charge so that he may 
defend himself against the allegation. The defendant contended that the 
indictment provided insufficient notice because it did not expressly name the 
underlying dangerous felony. The Supreme Court of Tennessee determined 
that the defendant possessed sufficient notice of the underlying dangerous 
felony because the “attempted second-degree murder” charge in Count One 
was the only count that constituted a dangerous felony. The state supreme 
                                                 
 5. State v. Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tenn. 2013). 
 6. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013). The Court in Henderson held 
that, under the plain error standard, a decision is error if adjudged an error at the time of appeal 
rather than the time of trial. 
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court also found that the firearm count referenced the applicable statutory 
section in the indictment. Finally, the defendant failed to argue any reason 
why the applicable precedent should be overruled. Thus, the state high court 
overruled the defendant’s challenge. 
Next, the court held that the trial court correctly decided to not 
instruct the jury on the necessity defense. The necessity defense constitutes 
a general defense, and thus the trial court must instruct the jury on the defense 
if the proof adduced at trial fairly raises the defense. The necessity defense 
may negate culpability if the defendant acts upon a reasonable belief that the 
action is necessary to avoid harm and where the harm to be avoided is clearly 
greater than the harm caused by the criminal act.7 Specifically, the court 
stated that the necessity defense was unavailable to the defendant, reasoning 
that, even if one of the victims had threatened to shoot the defendant, his 
shooting towards the convenience store endangered multiple other people 
uninvolved in the altercation.8 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that the State 
introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to convict the defendant of 
assaulting the convenience store owner.9 The defendant contended that he 
did not assault the owner because the owner was behind bulletproof glass. To 
prove that the defendant assaulted the owner, the State had to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally caused the owner to 
reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.10 At trial, the owner testified that he 
was scared after the defendant shot at him. The court decided that the 
defendant was simply requesting that the court reweigh the evidence that jury 
already decided in the State’s favor. Thus, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assaulting the store owner. 
In conclusion, the law now holds that the Tennessee legislature 
intended that the phrase “not engaged in unlawful activity” contained in the 
self-defense statute constitutes a condition on an individual’s privilege to not 
retreat prior to exercising self-defense. Thus, a convicted felon, such as the 
defendant in this case, seemingly must retreat prior to engaging in any use of 
a firearm for self-defense purposes. Next, the trial court now possesses the 
duty of determining whether a defendant was engaged in unlawful activity at 
the time of the alleged self-defense as to negate the applicable instruction. 
                                                 
 7. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-609 (2014 & 2017 Supp.). 
 8. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 407 (Tenn. 2017). The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
decided the issue differently than did the Court of Criminal Appeals, as the intermediate 
appellate court grounded its decision on the fact that a crime of violence occurred rather than 
a cost-benefit analysis the state supreme court seemingly undertook. 
 9. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions . . . shall be set 
aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the finding by the trier of fact of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (the key inquiry is 
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
 10. See Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-101(a)(2) (Supp. 2009). 
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Those holdings are the newest additions to Tennessee law. However, the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee also concluded that, in this case, the trial court 
properly instructed the jury when it did not instruct it on a lesser-included 
offense of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony; that 
the indictment provided sufficient notice of the qualifying dangerous felony 
for purposes of the “employing a firearm” charge; that the trial court did not 
err when it did not instruct the jury on the necessity defense; and that the 
State introduced sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of assault. 
 
